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The Long and Winding Road from Monroe to Connick
Sheldon Nahmod1

I. INTRODUCTION
What I propose to do is sketch a history of § 19832 local government liability in the
Supreme Court, including Connick v. Thompson, and then situate Connick more generally in §
1983 jurisprudence.3 I will emphasize the importance to the Court, in the last several decades
especially, of federalism and its impact on the scope of § 1983. Section 1983 is a kind of
federalism lightning rod because it is a federal statute enforced against state and local
governments by the federal judiciary.4
The Court’s interest in federalism in the § 1983 setting includes an increasing concern
with federal judicial intervention in, and second-guessing of, the decisions of local
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Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., L.LM, Harvard
Law School; M. A. Rel. Stud., University of Chicago Divinity School. I want to thank the Journal for inviting me to
participate in this very interesting symposium.
In an effort to preserve the unique nature of the symposium, this article is based largely on a transcript of Professor
Nahmod’s presentation and his notes and has been edited and supplemented with references in order to facilitate
research in the area of § 1983.
2

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
3
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
4
See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). See generally S. NAHMOD,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2011)
[hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES LITIGATION].
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governments.5 Federalism, broadly defined, has affected not only § 1983 local government
failure to train liability, but also the scope of constitutional rights and the extent of the absolute
and qualified immunity of state and local government officials.
II. BACKGROUND: FEDERALISM, THE COURT, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO TRAIN
It may be in order to briefly remind ourselves of several important points about
federalism as contemplated by the Framers. Federalism is intended not only to preserve state
powers but, like separation of powers, to protect citizens from possible tyranny of the federal
government.6 It is structural in nature.7 Other important values include efficiency, promoting
individual choice, encouraging experimentation and promoting democracy.8 To a considerable
extent, the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments changed this—the degree to which it
did so remains controversial to this day—by recognizing that the states could pose dangers to
their citizens and that it was the federal government that should protect them.9
Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 by the 42nd Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment; however, it remained largely dormant until 1961 when the Supreme Court decided
Monroe v. Pape.10 It was dormant until this time because incorporation of the Bill of Rights only

5

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“…the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between
federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases.”) ; United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (“This case requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government and
to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution.”); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The great innovation of this design was that “our citizens would have two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other...”) (citation omitted); United States
v. Morrision, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.”) (citations omitted).
6
See Erwin Chermerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 524-25 (1995).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Lopez v. Monterey Cnty. 525 U.S. 266, 268 (1999) (“…the Reconstruction Amendments…by their nature
contemplate some intrusion into areas traditionally reserved to the States.”).
10
See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd CONG., 1ST SESS. 83 (1871); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (“… as defining the rights secured
by the Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and
it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since become a part of the Constitution, viz.,
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began in earnest in the 1960s, and the state action doctrine was being developed in fits and starts
to encompass more and more nominally private conduct, including joint conduct.11
Monroe not only changed the § 1983 landscape but it also resurrected § 1983.
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Monroe interpreted the statute as creating a Fourteenth
Amendment damages action, a constitutional tort, against Chicago police officers for allegedly
violating the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.12 In so doing, the Court
importantly ruled: (1) “color of law” is as broad as state action;13 (2) a plaintiff need not first
exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a § 1983 claim in federal court;14 and (3) § 1983
should be interpreted against the background of tort liability that makes a person responsible for
the natural consequences of his or her conduct.15
Two other aspects of Monroe are important for present purposes. First, Justice
Frankfurter’s dissent argued at great length that “color of law” was narrower in scope than state
action.16 This meant that § 1983 did not cover all Fourteenth Amendment violations. His dissent
was grounded on a view of federalism that insisted that the Framer’s concept of federalism was
not changed much, if at all, by the Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment.17 This dissent turns out to have anticipated future developments in the Court,

the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (quoting Senator George F. Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).
11
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-23 (1961) (discussing private conduct in the context of
the Fourteenth Amendment). See, on state action and color of law, NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
ch. 2.
12
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192.
13
Id. at 187.
14
Id. at 183.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 217-59 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
17
Id. at 221-39.
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including the City of Boerne case that imposed rather severe limitations on Congress’s Section 5
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.18
Second, the Court held unanimously (prompted in large measure by a lengthy memo on §
1983’s legislative history to the other justices by Justice Frankfurter) that local governments
were not suable persons.19 It may be significant that Monroe was decided six years after Brown
II,20 which started the Court down the road of equitable federal judicial supervision of, and
intervention in, school district decision-making, sometimes on a day-to-day basis.21 Brown
marked the beginning of institutional reform litigation in the Supreme Court, and perhaps, the
Court simply did not want at such a delicate time, to confront the specter of § 1983 damages
actions brought against school districts that had engaged in school segregation.22
It was only in 1978 that the Court, in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, overruled the
local government liability holding of Monroe.23 In an opinion by Justice Brennan that revisited
the legislative history of § 1983 and concluded that Monroe had gotten it wrong, the Court held
that local governments of all kinds, special or general purpose, were suable persons under §
1983.24 Further, the Court held that local governments could be liable for damages where the
constitutional violation was committed by a local government official or employee pursuant to

18

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-29 (1997) (discussing Congress’ power under Section 5 and how
that power is constrained when enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the States).
19
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191-92.
20
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
21
See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964); Green v. Ctny. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42
(1968); Alexander v. Holmes Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
22
See David Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation: A Commentary on
the Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Second Circuit’s Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1993).
23
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 700 (1978). See, on local government liability, NAHMOD,
CIVIL RIGHT AND LIBERTIES ch. 6.
24
Id. at 700.
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an official policy or custom.25 Moreover, the Court emphasized Congressional intent to subject
local governments to damages liability under § 1983.26
At the same time, the Court in Monell rejected respondeat superior liability altogether
because of § 1983’s “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language.27 This insistence on avoiding
respondeat superior liability was later to emerge with a vengeance in the Court’s failure to train
and supervise decisions in City of Canton v. Harris28 and Bryan County v. Brown,29 the
precursors to Connick v. Thompson.30
Monell expressed little concern with federalism and over-deterrence because the Court
correctly assumed that Congress was well within its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose damages liability on local governments.31 Indeed, the Court soon
thereafter went beyond Monell and held in Owen v. City of Independence32 that local
governments were not protected by qualified immunity.33
It is worth noting that by 1978, the Court and the country were, for the most part, past the
Southern resistance to Brown.34 De jure segregation in the public schools and elsewhere was
technically over; however, de facto segregation and re-segregation were of greater concern.35 So
25

Id. at 694-95.
Id. at 696-700.
27
Id. at 658.
28
489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989) (holding that under certain circumstances municipalities can be held liable under § 1983
for constitutional violations stemming from failure to train its employees).
29
520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (holding that unless there is deliberate action that is attributable to the municipality and
is the driving force behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights, Congress did not intend for a municipality to
be held liable under § 1983).
30
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
31
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (holding that a municipality was a person under § 1983); but cf. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (using Eleventh Amendment language, the Court held that states were not suable
persons under § 1983 regardless of where sued).
32
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
33
Id. at 657; but see Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that history and policy do
support imposing punitive damages on municipalities for the bad-faith actions of its officials).
34
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional).
35
The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of Law, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (1999) (“Although the Supreme Court’s second Brown decision in 1955 (Brown II)
26
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there was little chance that there would be a flood of § 1983 damages actions against school
districts that had previously engaged in school segregation.
Significantly, Monell, which clearly involved an official policy set out by the local
government entity itself, also stated that official policy could be made by “[lawmakers] or by
those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy.”36 Monell thus created
the policymaker category, under which a local government could be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of a high ranking government official considered under state and local
law to be a policymaker.37 In other words, the unconstitutional conduct of a policymaker could
be attributed to a local government. The Court’s subsequent decisions regarding policymakers
made clear that even a single incident, that is, a single unconstitutional act of a policymaker,
could be attributed to the relevant local government and render it liable.38
As a lead-in to City of Canton, note that in 1985, the first Supreme Court decision to
address failure to train liability was handed down in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle.39 In Tuttle,
the Court ruled that an instruction to a jury that a city’s failure to train liability could be based on
a single incident was reversible error, and that the deliberate indifference state of mind
requirement, as a matter of § 1983 interpretation, was an effective way of avoiding respondeat
superior liability.40

directed school officials and federal district courts to plan ‘a transition to…racially nondiscriminatory school
system[s]’ with ‘all deliberate speed,’ many southern states instead radically altered their education laws to thwart
desegregation.”) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
36
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
37
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“Monell reasoned that recovery from a municipality is
limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’—that is, acts which the municipality has
officially sanctioned or ordered.”).
38
Id. at 480 (“…it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers
under appropriate circumstances.”).
39
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
40
Id. at 822-24.
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Finally, in 1989, City of Canton v. Harris firmly established the principle, somewhat
counter-intuitive, that a local government’s failure to train its police officers could constitute an
actionable official policy or custom.41 Specifically, a local government’s deliberately indifferent
failure to adequately train its police officers with regard to the rights of citizens with whom the
police come into contact could constitute an actionable official policy or custom.42 It was thus
the inadequate training that constituted the official policy or custom.43 In articulating this
deliberate indifference standard (rather than, say, a negligence standard), the Court in City of
Canton was very careful to emphasize that it was concerned with the specter of respondeat
superior liability in the guise of liability based on a single incident of police misconduct.44 The
Court also insisted that there be a close causal connection between the identified deficiency in
training and the plaintiff’s constitutional violation.45
On the other hand, in a footnote that turned out to be significant over two decades later in
Connick, the Court in City of Canton observed that there could be rare situations in which the
need for training was so obvious that it would constitute actionable deliberate indifference.46 For
example, where a city knows that police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons and it
supplies the police with firearms but does not provide them with any training in the use of deadly
force, it is obvious that training was required, and thus the failure to provide it constitutes
actionable deliberate indifference.47

41

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989).
Id. at 388.
43
Id. at 390-92.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 385-86.
46
Id. at 390 n.10.
47
Id.
42
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that in his opinion for the Court, Justice White explicitly
emphasized that important federalism interests were implicated in local government liability
failure to train situations.48 Specifically, the Court questioned whether it was appropriate for the
federal courts to second-guess local government training programs.49
Consider why this is so: what is on trial in failure to train cases is the local government’s
training program itself. A plaintiff must prove what adequate training is and why the training
offered was inadequate. This requires federal courts to carefully evaluate every aspect of that
training in order to decide whether the plaintiff’s claim can go forward. Even though this inquiry
is made in connection with damages and not equitable relief, it nevertheless remains intrusive.
Indeed, it is typically more intrusive than a §1983 damages action based on an official policy or
custom of the local government itself or on the single act of a policymaker.50
Eight years after City of Canton, Bryan County v. Brown addressed a § 1983 damages
action against a county based on an allegedly improper hiring decision by a county sheriff who
was a policymaker for the county.51 Inadequate screening was the specific claim.52 A deputy
sheriff hired by the county sheriff used excessive force against a woman and seriously injured
her when he pulled her out of her car.53 The plaintiff claimed that had the county sheriff
adequately screened the applicant for deputy sheriff, he would have found that assault and
battery charges had once been leveled against the applicant.54

48

Id. at 392.
Id.
50
Id. at 391-92.
51
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
49
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Notice the tension in Bryan County between the Court’s previously established principles
that (1) a single decision by a policymaker could render a local government liable55 and (2) there
was no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.56 The latter principle established a posture of
extreme skepticism toward local government liability based on a single incident.57
Here is what is important for present purposes: in Bryan County, the Court tightened up
the deliberate indifference standard of City of Canton and declared:
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a
reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the
decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third person’s
federally protected right can the official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the
applicant’s background constitute “deliberate indifference.”58
And in Bryan County itself, even adequate screening that would have discovered the assault and
battery charge would not necessarily have avoided this particular Fourth Amendment violation,
the use of excessive force.59 Put another way, this particular constitutional violation was not the
plainly obvious consequence of the allegedly inadequate screening, with the result that the
county sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to it.
Bryan County thus made the proximate cause inquiry much more difficult for a plaintiff
to overcome by focusing on the particular constitutional violation that occurred, and not
constitutional violations in general.60 As a result, there is both a deliberate indifference
requirement and a related, and tough, proximate cause requirement for § 1983 plaintiffs.61 And
even though, as a technical matter, this requirement was announced in an inadequate screening,
55

See Pembaur v. City of Cinncinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 489 (1986).
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 490-92 (1989).
57
See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821-22 (1985).
58
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411(emphasis added).
59
Id. at 411-14.
60
See id.
61
Id. at 415.
56
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hiring case, the circuits have tended to apply the “plainly obvious consequence” standard in
failure to train cases generally.62
Consequently, the Court in Bryan County gave lower federal courts even greater judicial
control over the failure to train liability issue than before. Not only was the policymaker question
one of law, but now federal courts could more readily take failure to train cases from juries by
applying the plainly obvious consequences standard.
As an historical footnote, Bryan County led three of the dissenting justices to advocate
Justice Stevens’ position from years earlier. Specifically, the dissenters believed that local
government liability law had become so complex, so arcane, that it was now time to reexamine
Monell’s holding that respondeat superior liability is not available under § 1983! 63
This brings us finally to Connick, handed down, as we all know, in 2011.64 I want to set
out the case in some detail, with your indulgence. After I offer some observations about Connick,
I will conclude, through a federalism lens, by situating Connick within § 1983 jurisprudence
generally.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CONNICK V. THOMPSON
In Connick, a 5-4 decision with an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court effectively held
that local government liability for failure to train may never be based on a single incident.65 This
is the case even in the face of an otherwise persuasive claim of deliberate indifference where the

62

See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1309 (10th Cir. 1998); Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, 209 F.3d 431,
435 (5th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Crawford Cnty., 299 F. 3d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2002).
63
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 437; see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-44 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-91 (1986) (Stevens, J. concurring).
64
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
65
Id. at 1365-66.
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need for training is “obvious.”66 Instead, the plaintiff must also show a pattern of similar
constitutional violations.67 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, concurred.68 Justice Ginsburg
dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan.69
A. THE FACTS AND ISSUES
The § 1983 plaintiff, Thompson, was convicted of murder and spent fourteen years on
death row (and eighteen years total in prison) for a crime that he did not commit.70 Although it
was unknown at the time, the prosecutors did not turn over to Thompson’s attorney a lab report
from an earlier related case in which he had previously been convicted of attempted aggravated
armed robbery.71 This lab report indicated that the perpetrator of the attempted armed robbery
had type B blood, while the plaintiff had type O blood.72 Because of that conviction, the plaintiff
did not testify in his own defense at his murder trial, where he was convicted.73 Many years later,
the lab report that the prosecutors had failed to turn over was discovered, which resulted in the
plaintiff’s 1999 attempted armed robbery conviction being vacated and his 2002 murder
conviction being overturned.74 A subsequent murder retrial in 2003, at which plaintiff testified in
his defense, resulted in a not guilty verdict.75
Thompson then sued the prosecutor’s office for damages under § 1983.76 In essence, he
made a local government liable for failure to train claim with regard to proper training under

66

Id.
Id.
68
Id. at 1366.
69
Id. at 1369.
70
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1356-57.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1357.
76
Id.
67
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Brady v. Maryland,77 which imposed a due process requirement on prosecutors to turn over
exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.78 A jury awarded Thompson $14 million, which
was upheld by the district court.79 On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the award in a
decision later vacated by the Fifth Circuit when it granted en banc review.80 However, since the
en banc Fifth Circuit (in several opinions) was evenly divided, the district court’s decision was
affirmed.81
The basis of the jury verdict and district court judgment was twofold. First, Connick, the
district attorney, was a policymaker (thus representing the prosecutor’s office) who was
deliberately indifferent to an obvious need to train prosecutors regarding their obligations under
Brady.82 Second, the lack of Brady training was the moving force behind the plaintiff’s
constitutional injury.83 The en banc Fifth Circuit divided evenly on each of these findings.84 The
Court granted certiorari to decide the following question presented: “Does imposing failure-totrain liability on a district attorney’s office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous
culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?”85 As noted, the Court
answered yes.86
B. THE ORAL ARGUMENT
The oral argument in Connick, with the participation of all of the justices but Thomas,
signaled the outcome. During the defense argument, Justice Ginsburg pointed out, as did Justice
77

Id.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
79
Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-2045, 2005 WL 1200826, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2007).
80
Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated, 562 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 2009), and aff’d en banc,
578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009).
81
Connick, 578 F.3d at 293 (en banc).
82
Id. at 296.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 293.
85
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011).
86
Id.
78
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Breyer later, that even though this was arguably just one incident, four prosecutors were
involved.87 She also wondered why it was necessary to shoehorn this case into a single incident
because it did not fit either into the single incident category or into the pattern of constitutional
violations category.88 Justice Breyer asked about the jury instruction that was objected to, which
eventually elicited the response that the case was about the evidentiary basis for the jury’s
finding of deliberate indifference.89 Justice Kennedy, who was to be the swing vote in this 5-4
decision, pointed out that the district court had rejected the defense’s pattern of constitutional
violations instruction.90
During the plaintiff’s argument, the attorney emphasized that this case was never about a
single incident, and that the plaintiff had never relied on a single incident theory.91 Justices Alito
and Roberts then hit plaintiff’s counsel hard with a series of questions about precisely what kind
of Brady training the district attorney should have provided.92 They repeatedly emphasized the
complexity—to them—of the training issue in this case.93 They also tried to identify the precise
inadequacy of training that the plaintiff was challenging.94 Counsel responded, at least in part,
that there was zero Brady training in the office.95 Justice Kennedy then commented, without
elaboration, that he was concerned about causation, perhaps suggesting that he could not find the
necessary causal link between the alleged inadequate training in Brady and the resulting Brady
violation.96

87

Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 23, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571).
Id. at 5.
89
Id. at 13-18.
90
Id. at 25-26.
91
Id. at 29.
92
Id. at 31-35.
93
Id. at 31-40.
94
Id. at 34-36.
95
Id. at 41.
96
Id. at 42-43.
88
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C. THE DECISION
1. The Majority
Even though there had apparently been no Brady training whatever of prosecutors before
1985 when the plaintiff was convicted of aggravated armed robbery, the Court, per Justice
Thomas, rejected the plaintiff’s argument that this was one of those rare cases hypothesized in
footnote 10 in City of Canton v. Harris.97 Recall that the Court in Canton had previously
determined that a pattern of constitutional violations is not necessary to prove deliberate
indifference where the need for training is “so obvious.”98 The Court once again emphasized the
stringency of the deliberate indifference requirement for local government liability for failure to
train, arising out the concern with avoiding respondeat superior liability under § 1983.99
According to the Court, prosecutors, unlike police officers going through training in the
use of firearms and deadly force to stop fleeing felons (the example in City of Canton), were
already trained in law in law school and had to pass a bar exam before they could practice.100 In
addition, there were continuing legal education requirements imposed on all lawyers.101 Thus,
“recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious consequence’ of failing to provide
prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the law.”102 Moreover, it was
undisputed in this case that prosecutors were “familiar with the general Brady rule,” in marked
contrast to armed police officers who have no prior knowledge at all about the constitutional use

97

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361 (2011).
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989); Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360-61.
99
Connick, 131 S. Ct at 1360-61.
100
Id. at 1362-63.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1363.
98

14

of deadly force.103 Under these circumstances, the absence of formal training in Brady was not
dispositive: this was not like the City of Canton hypothetical.104
The Court concluded:
To prove deliberate indifference, Thompson needed to show that Connick was on
notice that, absent additional specified training, it was ‘highly predictable’ that the
prosecutors in his office would be confounded by those [Brady] gray areas and
make incorrect Brady decisions as a result. In fact, Thompson had to show that it
was so predictable that failing to train the prosecutors amounted to conscious
disregard for defendants’ Brady rights.(emphasis in original). [And Thompson]
did not do so.105
2. The Concurrence
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, concurred for the purpose of responding to the
arguments of the dissenters.106 Justice Scalia accused the dissenters of a “puzzling” and
“lengthy” excavation of the trial record in a misguided attempt to broaden the scope of failure to
train liability.107 He also rejected their contention that the defendant acquiesced in the plaintiff’s
single incident theory.108 Furthermore, he criticized the dissenters’ position that, with proper
training, “surely at least one” of the prosecutors would have turned over the exculpatory
evidence.109 Finally, he suggested that any possible Brady violation in this case “was surely on
the very frontier of our Brady jurisprudence.”110

103
104

Id.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). The footnote states:
For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required
to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to
accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of
deadly force, can be said to be “so obvious,” that failure to do so could properly be characterized
as “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights.

Id.
105

Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1367.
109
Id. at 1368.
110
Id. at 1369.
106
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3. The Dissent
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (which she read in part from the bench), joined by Justices
Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, argued that the evidence submitted to the jury indicated that the
“conceded, long-concealed prosecutorial transgressions were neither isolated nor atypical.”111
“From the top down,” in the view of the dissent, prosecutors inadequately addressed their Brady
obligations.112 Accordingly, a jury could have found that such inattention was “standard
operating procedure” in Connick’s office.113 For this reason, City of Canton’s deliberate
indifference standard was met here, even though there was no proof of a pattern of similar
constitutional violations: the resulting Brady violation was the obvious consequence of the
inadequate training.114
Furthermore, according to the dissent, Connick had “effectively” conceded that his
office’s Brady training was inadequate.115 In addition, at the time of Thompson’s trial, Louisiana
did not require continuing legal education for lawyers, thereby placing responsibility on
Connick’s office for keeping prosecutors current on legal developments.116 Moreover, the
majority’s reliance on law school and bar admission requirements “blinks reality and is belied by
the facts of this case.”117 This case therefore fit well within City of Canton’s category of cases in
which the need for training was so obvious that the failure to provide it could be said to
demonstrate deliberate indifference; proof of a prior pattern was not necessary here.118
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F. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CONNICK
The question presented for review by the defense was very well crafted to attract the
Court’s attention at the certiorari stage. Motivated in large measure by the federalism concerns I
mentioned earlier, the Court has long been concerned about the (mis)use of a single
constitutional violation to impose liability on local governments for failure to train.119 Connick
presented the Court with the opportunity to bury the City of Canton hypothetical once and for all,
an opportunity that the Court seized.
Also, observe that Connick involved the training of prosecutors.120 But the Court’s
reasoning suggests that plaintiffs in all failure to train cases will have to show a pattern of prior
constitutional violations in order to demonstrate deliberate indifference.121
Further, with Connick, the Court has extended protection from damages liability to all
levels of prosecution.122 Clearly, the individual prosecutors in Connick who failed to discharge
their Brady obligations were absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability in their
individual capacities because their conduct was advocative in nature.123 Moreover, Connick
himself as supervisor was similarly absolutely immune from damages liability personally.124
This is supported by the Court’s holding in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, which stated that
supervisory prosecutors charged with failing to train prosecutors in connection with the proper
use in criminal trials of jailhouse informants are absolutely immune from damages liability in
119
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their individual capacities, despite the fact that this function is administrative in nature.125 The
Court’s reasoning in Van de Kamp almost certainly applies to supervisory failures to train
prosecutors about Brady. And now, the Court in Connick has made it considerably more
difficult to make out a cause of action against a prosecutor’s office for failure to train.126
In addition, there was a hidden Bryan County causation issue in Connick that was not
addressed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not address it (nor did it have to)
perhaps because it had a bigger project in mind, namely, eliminating the City of Canton
hypothetical. But here it is.
Thompson sought damages for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment for murder.127
But, so far as I can tell, the failure to train and Brady violation occurred in connection with his
prior conviction for attempted aggravated armed robbery.128 It was this failure to train and Brady
violation that allegedly led to his attempted aggravated armed robbery conviction that, in turn,
led to his not taking the stand in the murder trial that then resulted in his murder conviction and
imprisonment.129 Query: was Thompson’s not taking the stand and the resulting murder
conviction and imprisonment really the plainly obvious consequence of the failure to train
prosecutors about the requirements of Brady in the prior attempted aggravated armed robbery
case? The proximate cause answer would appear to be no, unless Thompson claimed that one or
more of the prosecutors in his attempted aggravated armed robbery case deliberately withheld
exculpatory evidence in order to prevent him from taking the stand in his murder case.
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Finally, I maintain Connick is best understood in the context of §1983 jurisprudence
developments generally. Over the past several decades, and at the same time the Court has been
gradually limiting local government liability for failure to train, culminating in Connick, the
Court has also been engaged in limiting the scope of § 1983 damages liability in other ways,
prompted in large measure, as I have suggested, by federalism concerns.
IV. CONNICK THROUGH A FEDERALISM LENS
One way the Court has been limiting local government liability for failure to train is
through limiting the scope of the underlying constitutional provision. The Court, out of concern
with both judicial intervention in, and judicial supervision of, local government decisions, and
with the chilling effect of § 1983 litigation on the decision-making of individual state and local
government officials, has limited the scope of procedural due process, substantive due process,
the Eighth Amendment, equal protection and the First Amendment.130
Another way the Court has limited the scope of § 1983 damages liability in the name of
protecting federalism is by gradually broadening the scope of qualified immunity for individual
government officials and employees. Qualified immunity was originally intended to minimize
the costs of liability.131 However, the Court has, to a considerable extent, converted it into the
functional equivalent of absolute immunity in an attempt to minimize the costs of defending.
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Thus, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, perhaps the most important qualified immunity decision of them
all, the Court eliminated the subjective part of the prior two-part qualified immunity test,
rendered that test objective and thus legal in nature and emphasized that qualified immunity
should be decided quickly as possible, preferably before discovery, in order to minimize the
costs of defending.132 In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court made the clearly settled law inquiry
rather case-specific, thereby increasing qualified immunity protection for defendants. 133 The
Court even bent the final judgment rule in Mitchell v. Forsyth, a decision that federal courts have
not been too happy with, and held that denials of defense motions for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity were immediately appealable on issues of law.134 The purpose: to let
qualifiedly immune defendants out from under § 1983 litigation as quickly as possible.
Connick was therefore not an aberration. It, like the other § 1983 decisions I have
discussed all too briefly today, reflects the Court’s sensitivity—some would say
oversensitivity—to federalism concerns. This includes an obvious wariness about federal
judicial intervention into state and local government matters regardless of the fact that it is
Fourteenth Amendment rights (including incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights) that are
protected by § 1983 damages actions.
Now recall Justice Frankfurter’s view of federalism, written way back in 1961 in Monroe
v. Pape, about the limited scope of § 1983’s color of law requirement.135 Here is what he wrote
in his dissent:
The jurisdiction which Article III of the Constitution conferred on the national
judiciary reflected the assumption that the state courts, not the federal courts,
132
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would remain the primary guardians of that fundamental security of person and
property which the long evolution of the common law had secured to one
individual as against other individuals. The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter
this basic aspect of our federalism.136
It is such a view that appears, in significant measure, to be animating the Court’s current
§ 1983 jurisprudence.
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